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Abstract
This paper focuses on the aggregation of distributed energy resources (DERs) through a
profit-maximizing intermediary that enables participation of DERs in wholesale electricity mar-
kets. Particularly, we study the market efficiency brought in by the large-scale deployment of
DERs and explore to what extent such benefits are offset by the profit-maximizing nature of the
aggregator. We deploy a game-theoretic framework to study the strategic interactions between
agreggators and DER owners. The proposed model explicitly takes into account the stochastic
nature of the DER supply. We explicitly characterize the equilibrium of the game under general
assumptions and provide illustrative examples to quantify the efficiency loss due to the strategic
incentives of the aggregator. Our numerical experiments illustrate the impact of uncertainty
and amount of DER integration on the overall market efficiency.
1 Introduction
Widespread adoption of distributed energy resources (DERs) coupled with advances in communica-
tion and information technology, are pushing electricity markets to a more decentralized consumer-
centric model. DERs typically include rooftop solar, small-scale wind turbines, electric vehicles as
well as demand-response schedules. More generally, a DER is “any resource on the distribution
system that produces electricity and is not otherwise included in the formal NERC definition of
the Bulk Electric System (BES)” [1]. The low-voltage side of the grid, traditionally comprising
mostly of passive small-scale consumers, is rapidly transforming into an active component of the
grid where prosumers respond to price signals for managing their consumption and production of
energy [2].
Transmission system operators lack visibility into the low and medium voltage distribution grid
where DERs are connected. Furthermore, DERs have relatively small capacities that together
with the high costs and complexities involved in their integration, render it impractical for such
resources to directly offer their services in wholesale electricity markets. Despite significant research
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on effective means to harness such resources, a unifying framework for integration and compensation
of DERs remains under debate.1 See [3–6] for insightful discussions.
One line of work promotes the implementation of distribution electricity markets operated by
an independent distribution system operator (DSO), that acts as a market manager and dispatcher
of DERs [7–9]. In this model, the DSO is responsible for collecting the offers and bids from market
participants and determine the appropriate prices to compensate DER asset owner-operators [10–
12]. Another approach advocates fully distributed market structures, where prosumers trade DER
services with each other as members of a coordinated and purely transactive community [13,14].
In this paper, we focus on a third DER participation model through an aggregator A – “a
company that acts as an intermediary between electricity end-users and DER owners, and the
power system participants who wish to serve these end-users or exploit the services provided by
these DERs”, according to [15]. California Independent System Operator (CAISO) allows such
aggregators with capacities north of 0.5MW to participate in its wholesale markets for energy and
ancillary services. See [16] for an analysis of CAISO’s model. Our focus is on efficiency impacts of
a profit-motivated retail aggregator – a topic that has not yet received much attention.
We model the interaction between an aggregator A and prosumers with DERs as a Stackelberg
game in Section 2. A procures DER capacities from prosumers upon offering them a uniform price,
and sells the aggregated capacity at the wholesale market price, profiting from arbitrage. DER
capacities are uncertain. A faces penalties for defaulting on its promised offer to the wholesale
market that she allocates among the prosumers. We analyze the resulting interaction, depicted
in Figure 1, via game theory and characterize its equilibria that explicitly models uncertainties in
DER supply. In Section 3, we introduce a new metric we call Price of Aggregation (PoAg) that
compares power procurement costs in the wholesale market from two different DER participation
models. In the first model, prosumers participate through A. In the second one, they participate
directly and offer their capacities in the wholesale market. The second model serves as the ideal
yet impractical benchmark for efficient DER participation. PoAg computes the efficiency loss due
to the strategic nature of the aggregator. We analyze the game between A and the prosumers with
various uncertainty models in DER capacities in Section 4 and leverage these insights to study
price of aggregation for illustrative example markets in Section 5. The results demonstrate how
uncertainty and the amount of DER integration affect the PoAg metric. We conclude the paper
in Section 6 with remarks and future research directions. Proofs of all mathematical results are
provided in the appendix.
2 The Game between the Prosumers and the DER Aggregator
Consider a retail aggregator A who procures energy from a collection of prosumers N := {1, . . . , N}
with DERs and offers the aggregate supply into the wholesale electricity market. A does not own
any generation or consumption asset. She purely acts as an intermediary. To procure DER supply,
she announces a uniform price ρ at which she aims to buy energy from the prosumers. The latter
respond by choosing how much energy each of the prosumers wishes to sell from their DERs such
as rooftop photovoltaic panels, plug-in electric vehicles, wall-mounted batteries, thermostatically
controlled loads, etc. DER supply is uncertain, owing to random variations in temperature, solar
insolation, electric vehicle usage, etc. As a result, the realized aggregate supply from all prosumers
1We remark that FERC has issued Order 841 on energy storage and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on DERs,
but is yet to define a binding framework for general DER participation in US wholesale markets.
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Figure 1: Interactions between prosumers, the DER aggregator, and the wholesale market.
• Nonnegativity: φ(xi,x−i;C) ≥ 0.
• Budget balance: ∑Ni=1 φ(xi,x−i;C) = λRT(X − 1ᵀC)+.
• No exploitation: xi − Ci ≤ 0 =⇒ φ(xi,x−i;C) = 0.
• Symmetry: xi − Ci = xj − Cj =⇒ φ(xi,x−i;C) = φ(xj ,x−j ;C).
• Monotonicity: xi − Ci ≥ xj − Cj =⇒ φ(xi,x−i;C) ≥ φ(xj ,x−j ;C).
Figure 2: Properties of the penalty sharing mechanism
may fall short of A’s promised offer in the DA market. In that event, A faces a penalty for defaulting
on its promise and allocates this penalty to the prosumers. In this section, we mathematize this
interaction between A and the prosumers in N as a Stackelberg game (see Figure 1). 2 Later in
this work, we explore how the outcomes of this game impact wholesale market efficiency.
Given a wholesale day-ahead (DA) market price λDA, A sets ρ, the price to procure energy
from the prosumers. Then, prosumer i ∈ N responds by offering to sell xi to A, who then offers
the aggregate procured DER supply3
X := 1
ᵀ
(x1, . . . , xN )
ᵀ
:= 1
ᵀ
x
to the DA market at price λDA. Here, 1 is a vector of all ones of appropriate size. We assume that
A is a price-taker in the wholesale market. That is, she believes that her wholesale offer will not
influence the wholesale market prices. This assumption is natural as aggregators today typically
do not command enough DER supply to exercise significant market power. In order to compute
the DA offer, let A believe that its entire offer will be cleared in the DA market. Thus, A hopes to
2For a comprehensive discussion on Stackelberg games, we refer to [17].
3We do not consider economic witholding or strategic capacity reporting.
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earn (λDA− ρ)X from DA transactions. The revenue from DA sales stems from price arbitrage. A
buys X from prosumers at price ρ and sells it to the wholesale market at price λDA, bagging the
difference. Setting a higher ρ reduces the price difference from the DA market price, but generally
incentivizes the prosumers to sell more of their DER supply, in turn, increasing the energy that A
can offer in the DA market.
Assume that prosumers in N are homogenous, each of whom can supply power from a collection
of DERs with installed capacity C. Let Ci ∈ [0, C] denote the sum-total of capacities from all
DERs with prosumer i. When offering to sell energy to A, this capacity remains unknown. Denote
by F , the joint cumulative distribution function (cdf) of
C := (C1, . . . , CN ) ∈ [0, C]N .
DER supply being uncertain, A may not be able to supply X in real-time that is promised
in the DA market. Assume that A buys back the deficit (X − 1ᵀC)+ at the real-time price λRT,
where we use the notation z+ := max{z, 0} for a scalar z. A then proceeds to allocate this penalty
to the prosumers. We adopt the cost-sharing mechanism studied in [18] to design said penalties.
Specifically, prosumer i pays the penalty
φ(xi,x−i;C) := λRT
(
X − 1ᵀC)+ (xi − Ci)+∑N
j=1(xj − Cj)+
. (1)
The penalty depends on her own offer xi, the collective offers x−i of other prosumers and the
realized supply C. Such a penalty or cost sharing mechanism enjoys several desirable “fairness”
axioms, thanks to the analysis in [18]. Each prosumer pays a fraction of the penalty that A pays
for supply shortfall. A prosumer who is able to meet its promised supply does not pay any penalty.
And, the penalty grows with the size of the shortfall. Finally, two prosumers with equal shortfalls
face the same penalties. These properties are summarized mathematically in Figure 2.
Real-time transactions do not affect A’s revenue. A therefore seeks a price ρ that optimizes her
profit from arbitrage in the day-ahead market and solves
maximize
ρ≥0
piA(ρ,x(ρ)) := (λDA − ρ)X(ρ). (2)
In the above problem, we make explicit the dependency of x and X on ρ. Wholesale markets
often only allow aggregations of a minimum size to participate, e.g., CAISO requires a minimum
capacity of 0.5 MW for a DER aggregator to participate [19]. Such restrictions can be included in
(2); we ignore them for ease of exposition. In fact, our previous analysis in [20] showed that if one
imposes a minimum capacity for the aggregator to participate, she might increase its offer price ρ
to prosumers, attracting them to offer a sufficiently large aggregate capacity.
Prosumer i offers to sell xi amount of energy to A. In doing so, he trades off between supplying
to A and consuming it locally. Denoting his utility of power consumption by u, prosumer i solves
maximize
0≤xi≤C
pii(xi,x−i, ρ) := ρxi + E
[
u
(
d0 + Ci − xi
)− φ(xi,x−i;C)] , (3)
given A’s offer price ρ. By selling xi to A, she receives a compensation ρxi at A’s offer price ρ.
Here, d0 ≥ 0 denotes the nominal energy consumption that prosumer i purchases at a fixed retail
rate either from a distribution utility or A. We ignore the cost considerations of nominal demand as
4
it does not affect our analysis. Assume throughout that u is nonnegative, concave, and increasing.
Also, we let d0 ≥ C, i.e., DER supply is not large enough to cover the nominal demand.
Recall that prosumer i offers xi before observing Ci and therefore, the aggregate real-time
supply from all N prosumers can fall short of the promised supply. In that event, A faces a penalty
that she allocates among the N prosumers, i’s share being φ(xi,x−i;C). Prosumers do not believe
their energy sales will affect real-time prices. Hence, the expected penalty for prosumer i in (3) is
given by
E[φ(xi,x−i;C)] = E[λRT]E
[(
X − 1ᵀC)+ (xi − Ci)+∑N
j=1(xj − Cj)+
]
.
In the sequel, we abuse notation and write λRT in place of E[λRT] throughout.
Given DA price λDA and expected real-time price λRT, the prosumer-aggregator interaction can
be summarized as a Stackelberg game G(λDA, λRT). A acts as a Stackelberg leader who decides
price ρ. Prosumers in N follow by responding simultaneously with energy offers x. A’s payoff
is given by piA, while prosumer i’s payoff is pii. The pair (x∗(ρ∗), ρ∗) constitutes a Stackelberg
equilibrium of G(λDA, λRT), if
pii(x
∗
i (ρ),x
∗
−i(ρ), ρ) ≥ pii(xi,x∗−i(ρ), ρ)
for all xi ∈ [0, C], ρ ≥ 0, i ∈ N, and
piA (ρ∗,x∗(ρ∗)) ≥ piA (ρ,x∗(ρ))
for all ρ ≥ 0. We establish in Theorem 1 when such an equilibrium exists and is unique in the
prosumer-aggregator game. The following assumption proves useful in the proof.
Assumption 1 (Random DER capacities). F is smooth, fully supported on [0, C]N , and invariant
under permutations.
Smoothness and full support implies that DER capacities do not have any probability mass, and
F is strictly increasing in each argument over [0, C]N . Invariance under permutations is natural
for geographically co-located DERs, implying that prosumers’ supplies are exchangeable. Given
this assumption, G(λDA, λRT) becomes a symmetric game among the prosumers. We establish the
existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium with symmetric reactions from prosumers. Later in this
work, we explicitly compute such equilibria and study their nature.
Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness). Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, a Stackelberg equilib-
rium (x∗(ρ∗), ρ∗) always exists for G(λDA, λRT) with a unique symmetric response from prosumers,
i.e.,
x∗i (ρ) = x
∗(ρ)
for each ρ ≥ 0 and i in N. Furthermore, if
1
2
(λDA − ρ) ∂
2X∗(ρ)
∂ρ2
<
∂X∗(ρ)
∂ρ
(4)
for all ρ > 0, then, the Stackelberg equilibrium is unique, where X∗(ρ) = 1ᵀx∗(ρ), .
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Our proof (which can be found in the Appendix) leverages a result from [21] that guarantees
existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game among prosumers, given A’s price.4 Ex-
ploiting the properties of the penalty sharing mechanism, we further establish that there exists
a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium x∗(ρ) that varies smoothly with ρ. A will never opt for a
price higher than λDA and her profit varies smoothly in ρ ∈ [0, λDA]. The smooth profit attains
a maximum over that interval, leading to existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium. The relation in
(4) implies that A’s profit becomes strictly concave and hence, the maximum and the equilibrium
become unique.
Next, we quantify the impact of DERs on wholesale market efficiency along the equilibrium
path in the prosumer-aggregator game.
3 Price of Aggregation
Prosumers with available supply capacity can supplant conventional generation. Our goal is to
characterize the impact of prosumer supply on the efficiency of the wholesale market. With a
stylized wholesale market model, we compute the total energy procurement cost under two different
models of prosumer participation. In the first model, aggregator A offers the aggregated procured
supply capacity from individual prosumers to the wholesale market. The second model describes
the ideal benchmark, where prosumers offer their supply capacity directly to the wholesale market.
The comparison of the energy procurement costs in these two frameworks for prosumer participation
leads to what we call the price of aggregation.
Consider a day-ahead wholesale market with dispatchable conventional generators and pro-
sumers (participating directly or through an aggregator) competing to supply a point forecast of
an inelastic demand D. Consider G dispatchable generators, labelled 1, . . . , G. Let producer j
supply Qj amount of energy within its production capability set as
[
Q
j
, Qj
]
. Let its dispatch cost
for producing Qj be given by cj(Qj), where cj is a convex, nondecreasing and nonnegative function.
We assume that cj truly reflects the production costs of the generator. In other words, we neglect
possible market power of dispatchable power producers [23–25], leaving a study of effects of strate-
gic interactions of conventional generators and aggregated prosumer supply to future endeavors.
The economic dispatch problems in these two participation models that the system operator solves
in day-ahead to clear the wholesale market are as follows.5
When prosumers participate through A: The economic dispatch problem under this prosumer par-
ticipation model is given by
C∗A := minimum
qA,Q
G∑
j=1
cj(Qj) +
∫ qA
0
pA(y)dy,
subject to Q
j
≤ Qj ≤ Qj , 0 ≤ qA ≤ X,
G∑
j=1
Qj + qA = D. (5)
4We remark that when prosumers are not homogenous and F is not permutation invariant, Rosen’s result in [22]
still guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the game among prosumers.
5We have ignored transmission network constraints in the wholesale market description for ease of exposition.
Introducing these constraints offers no conceptual difficulty.
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The inverse supply offer pA(y) indicates the minimum price at which A is willing to sell y amount
of energy. The aggregated supply capacity for a wholesale market price pA is given by X[ρ∗(pA)],
where X = 1Tx(ρ), and (x(ρ∗), ρ∗) is the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game G(pA, λRT). By
utilizing the equilibrium price path ρ∗(pA) and taking the inverse of X[ρ∗(pA)], one can compute
the inverse supply offer pA(X). Once (5) is solved, the day-ahead price λDA is given by the optimal
Lagrange multiplier of the supply-demand balance constraint.
When prosumers directly participate: Similarly, the economic dispatch problem under this prosumer
participation model is given by
C∗P := minimum
q,Q
G∑
j=1
cj(Qj) +
N∑
i=1
∫ qi
0
pi(yi)dyi,
subject to Q
j
≤ Qj ≤ Qj , 0 ≤ qi ≤ C,
G∑
j=1
Qj +
N∑
i=1
qi = D. (6)
Here, pi(yi) is the inverse supply offer for each prosumer. Given a wholesale market price pi faced
by prosumer i, his response yi(pi) is computed by solving
argmax
yi∈[0,C]
{
piyi + E
[
u
(
d0 + Ci − yi
)− λRT(yi − Ci)+] }. (7)
Taking the inverse of yi(pi), one can compute pi(yi). The day-ahead price λDA is the optimal
Lagrange multiplier of the supply-demand balance constraint. Note that here, there is no cost
sharing game among prosumers, as they are directly penalized for their corresponding shortfalls.
Alternatively, one can take yi(pi) to be the symmetric equilibrium response by prosumers y(p),
taking into account their cost shares, and then finding its inverse p(y). In that case, the benchmark
model is one in which DER supplies are concatenated via a purely social aggregator, who does not
make profits from price arbitrage. Our analysis and insights in this paper are largely unaffected by
such a variant of the benchmark model.
The supply capacity of a prosumer is typically too small for consideration in a wholesale market,
and computing the dispatch and settlement for a large number of prosumers places an untenable
computational burden on the system operator. To complicate matters, a transmission system
operator typically does not have visibility into a distribution network. Hence, neither can they
ensure that the DER dispatch will induce feasible flows in the distribution network, nor can they
audit the actual supply. It is imperative that DER supply capacities are aggregated for participation
in the wholesale market. The idealized direct prosumer participation model serves as a benchmark
for the performance of any aggregation mechanism. Our other model for prosumer participation
analyzes the case of a single profit-maximizing DER aggregator who chooses to represent the
supplies from all prosumers in a system operator’s footprint. In reality, such an entity will either be
regulated or several aggregators will compete for prosumer representation, e.g., in [26]. The loss in
efficiency due to the strategic incentives of this single aggregator represents the maximum such loss
the market will endure. Extending the model to incorporate competition for aggregation remains an
interesting direction for future research. Without DER participation, the market does not harness
possible resources, and hence, is inefficient. However, the presence of A brings an efficiency loss due
to the strategic incentives of A, compared to the benchmark case in which prosumers participate
directly in the wholesale market. We introduce the following metric of efficiency loss.
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Definition 1. The Price of Aggregation (PoAg) is given by
C∗A
C∗P , where both C
∗
A and C∗P are computed
using Stackelberg equilibrium supply offers from all market participants in the wholesale electricity
markets.
PoAg ≥ 1 measures the efficiency loss of prosumer participation through an aggregator compared
to direct prosumer participation. A larger PoAg indicates a higher efficiency loss due to aggregation.
We will now analyze the PoAg in various settings. To do so, one needs to construct the supply
offers, that in turn, depends on the equilibrium in G(λDA, λRT). We construct these supply offers
under two extreme cases for the stochasticity of DER supply.
4 Studying the equilibrium of G(λDA, λRT).
While Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium, it does not offer insights
into the structure of said equilibrium. For general probability distributions on DER capacities
in C, characterization of such equilibrium remains challenging. Here, we study two settings for
which such computation is easy–one where the capacities are completely dependent with identical
components in C, and the other where the capacities are independent but identically distributed
(iid). One expects the capacities in practice to follow a distribution that is somewhere between
these two extremes.
To motivate these two regimes, imagine that prosumers are supplying energy from rooftop solar.
For geographically co-located prosumers, one expects high correlation among Ci’s. If two prosumers
are geographically separated, independence among Ci’s might arise. A more realistic model is one
with a collection of prosumer clusters that have highly correlated supply capacities within clusters,
but independent between clusters. We relegate such considerations to future efforts and examine
the two simpler settings here.
We study the iid case through the lens of mean-field (MF) games in the large prosumer limit
N → ∞. Such games have gained popularity following the seminal works in [27, 28] and are
particularly useful to analyze interactions among a large number of players, where players respond
to the population as a whole. Taking N →∞ in G(λDA, λRT) yields(∑N
j=1(xj − Cj)
)+
/N∑N
j=1(xj − Cj)+/N
→ β, almost surely, (8)
following the law of large numbers, where β is a constant. Then, the penalty of shortfall for
prosumer i becomes βλRT(xi − Ci)+ and he maximizes
E
[
u
(
d0 + Ci − xi
)
+ ρxi − βλRT(xi − Ci)+
]
, (9)
given β. Further, β is such that the solution of the above maximization satisfies (8). Jensen’s
inequality on f(z) = z+ yields 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Call this game G∞(λDA, λRT).
Theorem 2 (Prosumer Offer Characterization). Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If C has identical
components, i.e., Ci = C for i ∈ N , then the prosumer offers for any ρ ≥ 0 in G(λDA, λRT) satisfy
F (x∗(ρ)) =
1
λRT
(
E
[
u′(d0 + C − x∗(ρ))]+ ρ) . (10)
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If Ci’s are iid, then in the limit N →∞, the prosumer offers x∗(ρ) for any ρ ≥ 0 in G∞(λDA, λRT)
satisfies
βFi(x
∗(ρ)) =
1
λRT
(
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗(ρ))
]
+ ρ
)
, (11)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is defined as
β =
x∗(ρ)− E[Ci]
E
[
(x∗(ρ)− Ci)+
] . (12)
The expressions in (10) and (11) are quite similar, implying that equilibrium offers of prosumers
in G(λDA, λRT) behave similarly between the two extreme settings with completely dependent and
independent DER capacities. These two settings provide the best and the worst-case PoAg. The
case with correlated but not fully dependent capacities in practice lies between these two extremes.
As the capacities become independent, the solution to the mean-field game satisfies x∗(ρ) ≥
E[Ci] owing to β ≥ 0. That is, a prosumer may offer more than his mean anticipated capacity. This
optimism stems from independence in supply capacities; a prosumer hopes that other prosumers
will likely cover any shortfall on his part, leading to zero penalty. In contrast, prosumers with
completely dependent capacities may choose x∗(ρ) < E[Ci] for small enough ρ. The room for
optimism disappears as all prosumers face the same uncertainty. Equipped with these insights into
the equilibrium in G(λDA, λRT), we study the impact of DER aggregation on wholesale market
efficiency through illustrative examples next.
5 Illustrative Examples
We now study equilibrium offers of an example collection of prosumers, the same for an aggregator
who participates in a wholesale market, and the resulting price of aggregation. Assume throughout
that N prosumers have linear utilities defined by u(z) = γz with γ > 0. 6
First, we examine the special case in which DER supply is deterministically C, i.e., Ci = C.
Then, φ = 0 and the payoffs of each prosumer is decoupled, given ρ. Each prosumer responds to ρ
by solving
maximize
0≤x≤C
u(d0 + C − x) + ρx.
If ρ > γ, each prosumer picks x∗ = C. As we show next, ρ > γ is not sufficient for prosumers to
sell their entire capacities when C’s are stochastic in nature.
Proposition 1. If Ci = C, i ∈ N is uniformly distributed in
[
µ−√3σ, µ+√3σ], then the unique
Stackelberg equilibrium (x∗(ρ∗), ρ∗) of G(λDA, λRT) satisfies
x∗(ρ) = µ−
√
3σ +
2
λRT
(ρ− γ)
√
3σ, for ρ ≥ γ,
ρ∗ =
1
2
(λDA + γ)− λRT(µ−
√
3σ)
4
√
3σ
.
6Accurately modeling the preferences u(·) of end-use customers in electricity consumption remains a challenging
task (see [29] for a discussion) and it is beyond the scope of this paper. While we adopt linear utilities here, we
remark that logarithmic utilities are commonly used in the economics literature [30] for various commodities, and
has recently found applications in the electricity market literature as well, e.g., in [31–33]. Using logarithmic utilities,
along with deterministic DER supply, our previous analysis in [20] reveals similar insights for price of aggregation.
In this work, we adopt linear utilities for ease of exposition and offer insights into the impact of uncertainty.
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Figure 3: Variation of equilibrium offer x∗(ρ) and A’s offer price ρ∗ with linear utilities. We choose γ =
2.5, µ = 10, λDA = 4, λRT = 4.
The proof of the above proposition can be found in the Appendix. In the presence of uncertainty,
prosumers’ response increases linearly in ρ, leading to the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibirum,
as dictated by Theorem 1. Larger the average random capacity µ, higher is the amount prosumers
agree to sell. Higher the randomness, as captured by σ, lesser is the amount prosumers offer,
owing to possible penalties they might face. Also, penalties are proportional to λRT. Consequently,
increasing λRT decreases their offers. Higher the possible penalty, either due to higher σ and λRT,
aggregator needs to increase its price offer ρ∗ to attract DER supply. Figure 3 visualizes the effect
of varying
σ ∈
[
λRTµ
2
√
3(λDA − γ + λRT/2)
,
µ√
3
]
,
for which the equilibrium path is well-defined. The plot corroborates our discussion above. For
σ in the above range, we have x∗(ρ) < µ/2. Contrast this result with iid capacities. Theorem 2
reveals that the mean-field solution satisfies x∗(ρ) ≥ µ. In fact for this problem, we have β = 0 and
x∗(ρ) = µ for ρ ≥ γ and ρ∗ = γ. The offer with iid capacities can be significantly higher than with
identical capacities.
5.1 Inverse Supply Functions
The equilibrium of G(pA, λRT) characterized in Proposition 1 implies the following aggregated
supply as a function of A’s price offer pA:
X[ρ∗(pA)] =
N
2
[
µ−
√
3σ +
2
λRT
(pA − γ)
√
3σ
]
(13)
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Figure 4: Left: Equilibrium supply offers. Here, γ = 2.5, µ = 10, σ = 3.3, and λRT = 4. Right: The
influence of varying σ on supply offers, for a fixed supply quantity.
The aggregator’s inverse supply offer is then described by its inverse
pA(X) = λRT(2X/N − µ+
√
3σ)/(2
√
3σ) + γ. (14)
The best response provided by Proposition 1 analogously solves (7), since capacities are com-
pletely dependent and prosumers are identical. The optimal supply offer by each prosumer is
then
x(p) = µ−
√
3σ +
2
λRT
(p− γ)
√
3σ. (15)
Each prosumer’s offer enters the objective function in problem (6) via its induced cost given by
p(x) = λRT(x− µ+
√
3σ)/(2
√
3σ) + γ. (16)
It is of interest to contrast how the aggregate supply capacity of the prosumers get offered in the
wholesale market under two different prosumer participation models, using (14) when A is present,
and using (16) for the prosumers-only case. Aggregator A offers the same supply capacity at a
higher price than the collection of prosumers in aggregate. This price inflation is a consequence of
the aggregator’s aim to maximize her profits from arbitrage between the wholesale market prices
and the prices she offers the prosumers (see Figure 4). To elaborate on the effects of uncertainty,
we fix a quantity X/N , and then vary σ. We observe that as the variance increases, DER owners
require higher prices that are also closer to A’s offer price. This is a consequence of the risks of
paying a penalty for the shortfall.
5.2 The Price of Aggregation
We now exploit the results in the previous subsection to analytically characterize the PoAg in the
next proposition, whose proof be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Left: Procurement costs as σ increases for 3 cases: without DER supply (maximum cost), with
DER supply and the existence of the aggregator (partial savings), and when prosumers offer their DER
supply directly to the system operator (minimum cost). Increasing uncertainty makes DER participation
unattractive to participants. Right: DER quantities cleared as σ increases. More utilization of resources
when DER owners directly participate. We use µ = 10, λRT = 4, γ = 2.5, κ = 3.25, D/N = 10.
Proposition 2. In a wholesale market with N DER suppliers, and one conventional generator
with cost
c(Q) = κQ, κ > γ, Q ∈ [0,∞],
the PoAg is given by C∗A/C∗P , where
C∗A = κD −
Nq∗
2
(
κ− γ + λRT(µ−
√
3σ)
2
√
3σ
− q
∗λRT
4
√
3σ
)
,
C∗P = κD −Nq∗
(
κ− γ + λRT(µ−
√
3σ)
2
√
3σ
− q
∗λRT
4
√
3σ
)
,
q∗ = µ−
√
3σ +
2
λRT
(κ− γ)
√
3σ.
Furthermore, in the absence of DER supply, the optimal procurement cost is κD.
One can readily observe by the above proposition that
κD > C∗A > C∗P .
Figure 5 plots the optimal procurement costs and quantities cleared as σ varies. As one expects,
procurement costs are minimized when prosumers offer their supply directly to the wholesale mar-
ket, and savings diminish as uncertainty increases. Aggregation via profit-maximizing A strikes
a balance between two extreme possibilities; no DER supply, and direct DER participation to
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Figure 6: Left: The price of aggregation as σ increases. The PoAg is monotonically decreasing with σ.
Right: The Price of Aggregation vs. % of DER supply. The PoAg is monotonically increasing with DER
integration. We use λRT = 4, γ = 2.5, and κ = 3.25. For the curve on the right, D/N = 10, σ = 3.3, and µ
varies from 0 to 10, reflecting percentage of integration.
the wholesale market. This is also consistent with the supply curves in Figure 4. We note that
intermediaries are inevitable, given the current wholesale market structures.
As the uncertainty increases, PoAg gets smaller as prosumers choose to sell less energy to the
wholesale market, leavingA with smaller profits. As the DER integration increases, more prosumers
sell energy, leading to increased profits for the aggregator. The worst-case PoAg is attained at 100%
integration and σ being near its lowest possible value at which the equilibrium path is well-defined.
Such a PoAg ≈ 1.15 here, which implies that the cost with the aggregator is at most 15% higher
than the benchmark case. Both costs are still smaller than having no DER participation at all.
Figure 6 illustrates these tradeoffs.
6 Conclusions and Future Directions
Our analysis points to debates surrounding the right design choice for incorporation of DERs in
the electricity market. Should they be aggregated by third-party for-profit aggregators, perhaps
where they vie to represent prosumers’ supplies in the wholesale electricity market? Or, should a
not-for-profit entity such as an independent distribution system operator be established to harness
supply capacities of resources at the grid-edge? While the debates themselves are beyond the scope
of this paper, we have provided a framework that will hopefully aid in quantifying the benefits of
different design choices.
In this paper, we considered and compared two different models of DER participation in whole-
sale electricity markets. In the first model, DERs directly offer their capacities in the wholesale
market, while in the second one DERs participate in aggregate via a third-party, for-profit aggre-
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gator. We modeled the strategic interactions between prosumers and the aggregator as a stochastic
Stackelberg game. We characterized equilibria and explored two extreme cases: DER capacities are
completely dependent or iid. At the equilibrium, we quantified the effects of aggregation through
a metric we called Price of Aggregation (PoAg).
There are several directions for future work. We assumed the DER aggregator to be a price-
taker in the wholesale market. However, under high penetration of DERs, it may be possible that
aggregators can influence the wholesale market price and engage in strategic bidding. Furthermore,
wholesale electricity markets typically have multiple settlements for energy procured in each hour.
Analysis of DER participation with and without an aggregator with stochastic supply and multi-
settlement wholesale market structure is another important direction for future work.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First, we show that a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists for the game among prosumers if F is
smooth. Then, we show that it is unique. Then, we show that a Stackeblerg equilibrium exists,
and derive a sufficient condition for its uniqueness.
If the payoff function pii(xi,x−i, ρ) is concave in xi ∈ [0, C] for each prosumer i, then the Nash
game among prosumers is concave, and hence, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in this case.
Furthermore, under Assumption 1, there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium [21]. It is sufficient to
show that the expected cost share E[φ(xi,x−i;C)] is both smooth and convex in xi and continuous
in x−i.
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Let s−i :=
∑
j 6=i(xj − Cj) and S−i :=
∑
j 6=i(xj − Cj)+. Note that both s−i and S−i are fixed
for the analysis of prosumer i’s problem. Then, the derivative
[
E[φ(xi,x−i;C)]
λRT
]′
w.r.t. xi is
[
E
[
(s−i + xi − Ci)+
S−i + (xi − Ci)+ (xi − Ci)
+
]]′
= E
[(
(s−i + xi − Ci)(xi − Ci)
(S−i + xi − Ci) 1{Ci≤Ci}
)′]
= E
[(
1 +
S−i(s−i − S−i)
(S−i + xi − Ci)2
)
1{Ci≤Ci}
]
, (17)
where Ci := min{xi, xi + s−i}, and we have used completion of squares to get the second equality.
Since the quotient of two continuous functions is a continuous function provided that the denomi-
nator is not equal to zero, it follows that [E[φ(xi,x−i;C)]]
′
is continuous if F is smooth, and hence,
E[φ(xi,x−i;C)] is smooth. Analogously, one can verify that E[φ(xi,x−i;C)] is continuous in x−i.
Next, by (17), [
E[φ(xi,x−i;C)]
λRT
]′′
= E
[
2S−i(S−i − s−i)1{Ci<Ci}
(S−i + xi − Ci)2
]
,
which is nonnegative since S−i ≥ s−i and S−i + xi − Ci > 0. Hence, E[φ((xi,x−i,C)] is convex in
xi and the payoff function pii(xi,x−i, ρ) is concave over compact set. This shows the existence of
a symmetric Nash equilibrium by [21, Theorem 3].
By the first-order necessary condition of optimality and (17), the best response x∗i , given x−i
and ρ, satisfies
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗i )
]
+ ρ+ η − η
λRT
= E
[(
1 +
S−i(s−i − S−i)
(S−i + x∗i − Ci)2
)
1{Ci≤Ci}
]
, (18)
where η is the nonnegative Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint x∗i ≥ 0 and η is
the one associated with the constraint x∗i ≤ C. In addition to (18), the complementary slackness
conditions and primal feasibility also need to be satisfied. Note that S−i ≥ s−i, and hence, we have
two cases. When S−i = s−i, and when S−i > s−i. These two cases define disjoint sets in which the
right hand side can be nonzero. Denote them by Xˆi and Xi, where
Xˆi : = {0 ≤ Cj ≤ xj , j ∈ N, s−i = S−i},
Xi : = {0 ≤ Ci ≤ Ci, s−i < S−i}.
For each set, we have
E
[(
1 +
S−i(s−i − S−i)
(S−i + x∗i − Ci)2
)
1{Xˆi}
]
= F (x∗i ,x−i).
E
[(
1 +
S−i(s−i − S−i)
(S−i + x∗i − Ci)2
)
1{Xi}
]
=: hi(x
∗
i ,x−i).
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A Nash equilibrium is attained at the intersection of best responses, and hence, by the first-order
conditions, Nash equilibria x∗(ρ) solve
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗i )
]
+ ρ+ η − η
λRT
= F (x∗i ,x
∗
−i) + hi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i), (19)
for each i ∈ N.
Recall that the Nash game we have here is also symmetric by Assumption 1, and a symmet-
ric equilibrium satisfies x∗i (ρ) = x
∗(ρ), for each prosumer i. Next, we show that the symmetric
equilibrium is also unique. Substitute x∗ for xj 6=i; then, the best response x∗(ρ) satisfies
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗)
]
+ ρ+ η − η
λRT
− (F (x∗) + h(x∗)) = 0. (20)
Note that
0 ≤ F (x∗) + h(x∗) ≤ 1
by the properties of E[φ]. Define
ρmin := −E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − xi)
] ∣∣∣
xi=0
ρmax := λRT − E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − xi)
] ∣∣∣
xi=C
Next, we split the analysis into five cases
• Case ρ < ρmin: By the properties of of u(·), it follows that E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗)
]
+ ρ < 0 for all
x∗ ∈ [0, C]. It also follows that η > 0, which implies that x∗ = 0 and η = 0 by complimentary
slackness.
• Case ρ = ρmin: For all x∗ ∈ [0, C], we must have η = 0 and
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗)
]− E [u′(d0 + Ci)]+ η
λRT
− (F (x∗) + h(x∗)) = 0.
If η > 0, then x∗ = 0 and we have
η
λRT
− (F (0) + h(0)) = η
λRT
= 0,
which is a contradiction. Hence, we must have η = 0 and
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗)
]− E [u′(d0 + Ci)]
λRT
− (F (x∗) + h(x∗)) = 0,
and x∗ = 0 is the only solution in view of the properties of F being strictly increasing in x∗ and
the first term being nonpositive.
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• Case ρmin < ρ < ρmax: For this case, we show that there exists a unique x∗ ∈ (0, C) that solves
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗)
]
+ ρ
λRT
− (F (x∗) + h(x∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:g(x∗)
= 0. (21)
If g(x) is strictly decreasing in x, and g(C) and g(0) have opposite signs, then there exists a
unique solution x∗. Given the properties of F and u(·), a sufficient condition for g(x) being
strictly decreasing is that h(x) is increasing. Next, we show that h′(x) ≥ 0. Let N be the
number of prosumers, then, it follows that
∂s−i
∂x
= N − 1, ∂S−i
∂x
= M < N − 1,
and the derivative h′(x) is given by
E
[(
S−i(s−i − S−i)
(S−i + x− Ci)2
)′
1{Xi}
]
= E
[
M(s−i − S−i) + S−i(N − 1−M)
(S−i + x− Ci) 1{Xi}
]
− E
[
2S−i(M + 1)(s−i − S−i)
(S−i + x− Ci)2 1{Xi}
]
= E
[
1{Xi}
(S−i + x− Ci)2 ×
(
2(M + 1)((S−i)2 − s−iS−i))
+ (Ms−i + S−i(N − 1− 2M))(S−i + x− Ci)
)]
≥ 0,
where the inequality follows from N − 1 > M , x − Ci ≥ 0, and S−i > s−i for each Xi. Hence,
h(x) is increasing in x, which leads to g(x) in (21) being strictly decreasing in x. Here, it also
holds that g(0) > 0 and g(C) < 0 and hence x∗ ∈ (0, C) and is also unique.
• Case ρ = ρmax:
For all x∗ ∈ [0, C], we must have η = 0 and
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗)
]
+ λRT − E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − C)
]− η
λRT
− (F (x∗) + h(x∗)) = 0.
If η > 0, then x∗ = C and F (C) + h(C) = 1 and hence
λRT − η
λRT
= 1,
and it must hold that η = 0, which is a contradiction. Next, let η = 0, then, we have
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗)
]
+ λRT − E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − C)
]
λRT
= F (x∗) + h(x∗),
and the only solution to the above equality is x∗ = C.
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• Case ρ > ρmax: It follows that for each x∗ ∈ [0, C], we have
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗)
]
+ ρ
λRT
> 1,
which implies that η > 0 and hence x∗ = C and η = 0.
The above five cases imply that x∗(ρ) is both unique and continuous in ρ, and X∗(ρ) = 1ᵀx∗(ρ) is
continuous in ρ. Thus, piA(ρ,x∗(ρ)) is also continuous, and the set over which ρ can take values is
compact. Hence, existence of a solution to (2) is guaranteed by the Weierstrass Theorem [34], and
a Stackelberg equilibrium always exists. Next, note that
∂2piA(ρ,x∗(ρ))
∂ρ2
= −2∂X
∗(ρ)
∂ρ
+ (λDA − ρ)∂
2X∗(ρ)
∂ρ2
.
When the inequality in the theorem holds, piA(ρ,x∗(ρ)) is strictly concave in ρ, leading to the
uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy ρ∗, and hence the equilibrium pair (x∗(ρ∗), ρ∗)
is unique.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 2
• At the symmetric equilibrium, by our assumptions, it follows that
Xi = ∅, i ∈ N =⇒ h(x∗) = 0.
Via the analysis of (20) in the proof of Theorem 1, it follows that it is optimal for A would to
pick ρmin ≤ ρ ≤ ρmax, in view of the symmetric optimal response x∗(ρ), as choosing ρ < ρmin or
ρ > ρmax does not increase A’s profit. It also follows via the same analysis that the symmetric
equilibrium is given by solving
F (x∗(ρ)) =
1
λRT
(
E
[
u′(d0 + C − x∗(ρ))]+ ρ) .
• By the first-order condition of problem (9), each player solves
E
[
u′(d0 + Ci − x∗)
]
+ ρ = λRTβ
[∫ x∗
0
(x∗ − Ci)f(Ci)dCi
]′
= βFi(x
∗), (22)
where the last equality follows from the Leibniz integral rule. Note that β ≥ 0 by definition, and
by the law of large numbers, β solves
β =
(E [x∗ − Ci])+
E
[
(x∗ − Ci)+
] ,
and the statement of the theorem follows.
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7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
By Theorem 2, with linear utilities,
F (x∗(ρ)) =
1
λRT
(ρ− γ).
When C is uniformly distributed over
[
µ−√3σ, µ+√3σ], it follows that
x∗(ρ) = µ+
(
2
λRT
(ρ− γ)− 1
)√
3σ, ρ ≥ γ.
Plugging the above into the aggregator’s problem, A’s payoff is
piA(ρ,x∗(ρ)) = N(λDA − ρ)
[
µ+
(
2
λRT
(ρ− γ)− 1
)√
3σ
]
,
which is quadratic and strictly concave in ρ. Taking the derivative and solving ∂piA(ρ,x
∗(ρ))
∂ρ = 0
leads to the statement of the proposition.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Since A is an inframarginal supplier, it follows that λDA = κ. With the aggregator, using (14), and
by the supply-demand balance constraint, Q = D − qA, it follows that C∗A is given by
min
qA∈[0,NC]
[
κD +
λRTq
2
A
2N
√
3σ
+
(
γ − κ− (µ−
√
3σ)λRT
2
√
3σ
)
qA
]
.
Solving the above yields
q∗A =
N
2
[
µ−
√
3σ +
2
λRT
(κ− γ)
√
3σ
]
.
Similarly, without the aggregator, C∗P is given by
min
q∈[0,C]
[
κD +
NλRTq
2
4
√
3σ
+
(
γ − κ− (µ−
√
3σ)λRT
2
√
3σ
)
Nq
]
,
which is solved at
q∗ = µ−
√
3σ +
2
λRT
(κ− γ)
√
3σ = 2q∗A/N.
With no DER supply at all, Q∗ = D, and the cost is κD. The statement of the proposition follows
from simple re-arrangements.
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